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In the ordinary case, an evil deed, without more, does not 
constitute a crime; a crime is committed only if the evil doer 
harbored an evil mind.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought.”2  When accused of first-degree murder in 
Minnesota, the prosecution must prove that a defendant physically 
committed the act and that he or she premeditated3 and intended4 
to kill.5  The jury is asked to look into the defendant’s subjective 
state of mind and determine if the prosecution has proven its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt.6  Conversely, defendants have a 
constitutional right to present relevant evidence refuting the 
prosecution’s allegations.7  Nonetheless, this constitutional right is 
restricted by the court’s power to deny the admission of certain 
evidence.8  With this power, Minnesota courts hold that psychiatric 
testimony cannot be used to disprove a defendant’s subjective state 
of mind during trial.9   
 
 1. 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 164 (15th ed. 1993).   
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2006).    
 3. “‘[P]remeditation’ means to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine 
to commit, the act referred to prior to its commission.”  MINN. STAT. § 609.18 
(2010).  
 4. “‘Intentionally’ means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing 
or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that 
result.”  Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 9(3).   
 5. A person is guilty of first-degree murder and will be sentenced to life in 
prison if he or she premeditated and intended to kill another.  Id. § 
609.185(a)(1).  A person is guilty of second-degree murder and will be sentenced 
to prison for no more than forty years if he or she intended to kill without 
premeditation.  Id. § 609.19, subdiv. 1(1).  
 6. See 10 STEPHEN E. FORESTELL & WAYNE A. LOGAN, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 
SERIES: JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES § 11.02 (5th ed. 2010).   
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; MINN. CONST. 
art. I, §§ 6–7 (amended 1988); MINN. R. EVID. 402; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 
14, 17–19 (1967) (“[The] right to offer the testimony of witnesses . . . is in plain 
terms the right to present a defense . . . [and] a fundamental element of due 
process of law.”); State v. Graham, 764 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn. 2009) (“Both the 
United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution provide a defendant 
with a fundamental constitutional right to present a full defense.”).  
 8. “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  MINN. R. EVID. 403.  
 9. See State v. Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816, 821–22 (Minn. 2009); State v. Bird, 
2
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Recently, in State v. Anderson, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
was asked to determine whether barring psychiatric testimony 
about a defendant’s Asperger’s Disorder (Asperger’s)10 denies a 
defendant his constitutional right to due process.11  Michael 
Anderson was charged with premeditated and intentional 
murder.12  At trial, Anderson attempted to offer psychiatric 
evidence of Asperger’s to explain his odd mannerisms, 
uncontrolled body movements, and brain function.13  His motion 
to admit this psychiatric evidence was denied.14  On appeal, 
Anderson argued the denial of this testimony greatly hindered his 
ability to challenge the State’s allegations that Anderson intended 
and premeditated murder.15  However, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court refused to budge from years of existing case law establishing 
that psychiatric testimony is irrelevant to the legal definitions of 
intent and premeditation.16   
This note first examines the history of criminal mens rea17 and 
the evolution of evidentiary rules relating to mental culpability in 
 
734 N.W.2d 664, 677–78 (Minn. 2007); State v. Griese, 565 N.W.2d 419, 425 
(Minn. 1997); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 104 (Minn. 1992); State v. Brom, 
463 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1990); State v. Jackman, 396 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Minn. 
1986); State v. Brown, 345 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn. 1984); State v. Bouwman, 328 
N.W.2d 703, 705–06 (Minn. 1982); State v. Torkelson, 404 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1987). 
 10. Asperger’s is a form of autism that is characterized by “severe and 
sustained impairment in social interaction . . . and the development of restricted, 
repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, and activities . . . .”  AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 80 (4th ed. 
2000).  “Perhaps the simplest way to understand Asperger’s syndrome is to think 
of it as describing someone who perceives and thinks about the world differently 
[than] other people.”  TONY ATTWOOD, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO ASPERGER’S 
SYNDROME 12 (2007).   
 11. State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Minn. 2010). 
 12. Id. at 232.   
 13. Id. at 235.   
 14. Id. at 233.   
 15. See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 19–20, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 
(No. A09-1141). 
 16. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 237.  “Existing case law provides that a 
defendant’s due process rights are not violated by exclusion of psychiatric 
testimony . . . .”  Id. (citing State v. Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Minn. 2009); 
State v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 673 (Minn. 2007); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 
104 (Minn. 1992); State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 763–64 (Minn. 1990); State v. 
Jackman, 396 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Minn. 1986)).   
 17. “Mens rea” is the state of mind that the prosecution must prove a 
defendant had when committing a crime; it is an essential element of every crime 
at common law.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009).  
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criminal law.18  It then details the facts and arguments made in 
Anderson, focusing on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding.19  
An analysis of the decision then follows.20  Finally, this note 
concludes by asserting that current Minnesota law barring 
psychiatric testimony is based on outdated and impractical 
philosophies on mental health, and likely violates a defendant’s 
constitutional right to due process.21   
II. HISTORY 
The law has long established that murder consists of two 
elements: a physical wrongful deed (the “actus reus”) and a guilty 
mind that produces the act (the “mens rea”).22  “The mens rea 
doctrine is most commonly associated with the Latin maxim actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea: an act does not make one guilty 
unless his mind is guilty.”23  The concept of mens rea originated in 
597 A.D. with St. Augustine and his writings on evil motive.24  In the 
thirteenth century, the leaders of England’s legal system embraced 
St. Augustine’s ideas that the evil intent of a person was the most 
important factor in all crimes.25  
By the eighteenth century, an offender’s evil motive and 
vicious will became essential components in English criminal law.26  
 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See infra Part V. 
 22. See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 117 (2011).  
 23. Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Rebecca E. Woodman, The Insanity of the Mens Rea 
Model: Due Process and the Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 28 PACE L. REV. 455, 463 
(2008) (citing Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932)) 
(stating similarly that an “evil mind” is required for a crime).   
 24. See id. at 463.  St. Augustine discussed the necessity of a guilty mind in 
relation to perjury by stating that “one commits perjury when he knowingly states 
what he believes to be false, even though he is in fact mistaken and his statement is 
true.”  Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of 
Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 355 (1966).   
 25. See Gilles Phillips & Woodman, supra note 23, at 464.  Henry Bracton, an 
English judge at the time, wrote:  
[W]e must consider with what mind . . . or with what intent . . . a thing is 
done, in fact or in judgment, in order that it may be determined 
accordingly what action should follow and what punishment.  For take 
away the will and every act will be indifferent, because your state of mind 
gives meaning to your act . . . .  
Sayre, supra note 23, at 985 (quoting BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSEUETUDINIBUS 
ANGLIA 101b).   
 26. See Gilles Phillips & Woodman, supra note 23, at 466 (citing Kelly A. 
4
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In 1769, England recognized that lunatics suffered from a 
deficiency in will that rendered them unable to tell right from 
wrong.27  This lack of free will prevented the courts from punishing 
these offenders.28  England’s first case that excused an insane 
offender from criminal liability established a rule of law that is still 
present in English and American courts today—the M’Naughten 
rule.29  
A. The M’Naughten Rule30 
In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten attempted to assassinate England’s 
prime minister by discharging a firearm into the prime minister’s 
carriage.31  At trial, the court found that M’Naghten suffered from 
paranoid delusions and found him not guilty by reason of 
insanity.32  For the first time, England recognized that it was a valid 
defense if the defendant could prove he did not possess the mental 
state necessary to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.33  
M’Naghten’s case resulted in a standardized insanity test, which 
many American jurisdictions implemented in their own criminal 
laws.34   
In 1885, Minnesota codified its version of the M’Naughten 
rule.35  Similar to England’s law, Minnesota’s statute stated that a 
 
Swanson, Note, Criminal Law: Mens Rea Alive and Well: Limiting the Public Welfare 
Offenses--In Re C.R.M., 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1265, 1266–67 (2002).    
 27. Gilles Phillips & Woodman, supra note 23, at 467 (citing 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24 (1769) (cited with 
approval in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).  
 28. Id.  
 29. See Michelle Migdal Gee, Annotation, Modern Status of Test of Criminal 
Responsibility—State Cases, 9 A.L.R.4TH 526, § 3(a) (1981).  
 30. The spelling of this name may vary.  “M’Naghten” was the name of the 
defendant, while the rule has been spelled as “M’Naughten” or “McNaughten.”     
 31. M’Naghten believed there was a conspiracy by the Prime Minister to kill 
him.  See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 719, 10 Clark & 
Finnelly 200, 200–01; Judith A. Northrup, Guilty But Mentally Ill: Broadening the 
Scope of Criminal Responsibility, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 797, 797 (1983).  In his attempt to 
kill the prime minister, he actually killed the prime minister’s secretary, who was 
riding in the carriage at the time.  M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 
(H.L.) 719, 10 Clark & Finnelly 200, 200–01. 
 32. See M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 720, 10 Clark & 
Finnelly 200, 202.  
 33. See id. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) at 720–21, 10 Clark & Finnelly at 205.   
 34. See Gee, supra note 29, § 3(a).   
 35. As codified in the Minnesota Penal Code, Minnesota’s M’Naughten rule 
stated:  
A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, 
5
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defendant would not be liable for a crime if he did not know the 
nature and quality of the act or he did not know the act was 
wrong.36  Minnesota first applied its newly drafted statute four years 
later in State v. Scott.37  Early on, beginning in 1889, Minnesota 
established that expert witnesses were not to testify on whether a 
defendant had insane delusions when he or she committed 
murder.38   
In 1960, many jurisdictions criticized the practicality of the 
M’Naughten rule.39  Yet Minnesota courts refused to change the 
rule.  Minnesota courts stated that because the rule was consistently 
used in the past,40 they would not modify the rule unless the 
legislature chose to do so.41  The legislature refused to change the 
M’Naughten rule.  In 1972, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
modified its rules of evidence when the defendant raised a defense 
of insanity.42  It held that when the issue of a defendant’s sanity is 
raised, evidence could be received freely so that the fact finder 
could take account of the person and his or her mind as a whole.43  
 
lunatic, or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of 
committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect 
of reason as either (1) not to know the nature and quality of the act he 
was doing; or (2) not to know that the act was wrong.  
State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 369, 43 N.W. 62, 63 (1889) (quoting MINN. PENAL 
CODE § 19 (1885)). 
 36. Id. 
 37. A man was charged with second-degree intentional murder after killing 
his wife.  See id. at 366, 43 N.W. at 62.  Scott claimed that he suffered delusions. Id. 
at 368–69, 43 N.W. at 63. 
 38. Id. at 368–69, 43 N.W. at 63. 
 39. State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 140–41, 100 N.W.2d 508, 511 (1960) 
(“Those who oppose the rule argue . . . that under modern psychiatric concepts 
[a] man’s reason is not the sole determinant of his conduct . . . .”).  Instead, 
opponents suggested emotional drives and pressures must be recognized in 
formulating an accused’s responsibility.  Id.  
 40. Id.; see also State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N.W. 638 (1935) 
(discussing insanity as stated in Scott, 41 Minn. at 369, 43 N.W. at 63); State v. 
Towers, 106 Minn. 105, 109, 118 N.W. 361, 362 (1908) (“[I]nstructions with 
reference to the defense of insanity were in accord with the rule which is 
thoroughly established in this court.”).  
 41. After the court drew attention to the problems the M’Naughten rule was 
creating, the only change the legislature chose to implement was to include the 
phrase “mentally ill or mentally deficient” in lieu of former terminology, including 
“a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity.”  MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (1961) 
(amended 1971). 
 42. See State v. Rawland, 294 Minn. 17, 46, 199 N.W.2d 774, 790 (1972) 
(allowing psychiatric evidence to establish that defendant’s mental illness 
prohibited him from knowing that murder was wrong). 
 43. Id. 
6
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The court held that what evidence was appropriate or relevant was 
now up to the judge’s discretion.44 
B. The Insanity Defense Reform Act 
Nearly a century after M’Naghten’s case, a well-known case 
involving John Hinckley raised serious questions about the future 
of the insanity defense and rules of evidence relating to mens rea.45  
After Hinckley’s acquittal, the public outrage that resulted 
prompted Congress to reexamine and modify its evidentiary rules.46  
In 1984, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act (the 
Act).47  The Act amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
preclude expert witnesses from stating opinions on whether a 
defendant had the required mental capacity for the crime 
charged.48 
In passing the Act, Congress intended to eliminate the 
doctrines of diminished capacity and diminished responsibility.49  
 
 44. Id. 
 45. John Hinckley attempted the assassination of President Reagan.  See 
United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (D.D.C. 1981).  Psychiatric 
testimony was admitted in Hinckley’s trial to prove that the defendant was insane.  
Id.  Ultimately, Hinckley was acquitted, despite shooting four people, including 
President Reagan.  United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  
Hinckley’s acquittal drew criticism from politicians.  Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity 
Defense, Post-Hinckley, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/opinion/18tue4.html (“After the acquittal, 
politicians . . . blamed the insanity defense for excusing a detestable and miserable 
man from imprisonment.”). 
 46. See PATRICIA E. ERICKSON & STEVEN K. ERICKSON, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND 
MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES IN CONFLICT 97–98 (2008).  
Adding fuel to the fire, in a 1983 interview with Penthouse magazine, Hinckley 
described a typical day: “I see a therapist, answer mail, play my guitar, listen to 
music, play pool, watch television, eat lousy food, and take delicious medication.”  
Allan Sonnenschein, John W. Hinckley, Jr., PENTHOUSE, Mar. 1983, at 103, 168, 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/51388040/Hinckley-Interview. 
 47. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402(a), 98 
Stat. 2057 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1985) and renumbered 18 
U.S.C. § 17 (1986)).  Section 17 states:  
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute 
that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, 
the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable 
to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.  
Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. 
18 U.S.C. § 17 (1986). 
 48. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (amended 1984). 
 49. See Judi S. Greenberg, Criminal Law and Evidence—Using Psychiatric 
Testimony to Negate Mens Rea Under the Insanity Defense Reform Act—United States v. 
Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 710 (1988), 61 TEMP. L. 
7
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However, Congress did not intend to bar all evidence relating to 
mental defects when a defendant did not use the insanity defense.50  
Even after Congress implemented the Act, courts were still left to 
interpret whether expert testimony could be used when a 
defendant did not plead an insanity defense.51 
Congress’s ratification of the Act had little effect on Minnesota 
law.52  Two years before the Act, Minnesota had already modified its 
evidentiary rules to prohibit psychiatric testimony regarding a 
defendant’s state of mind.53  Minnesota’s rules stated that a 
defendant who wished to introduce evidence regarding his or her 
mental culpability needed to raise the insanity defense.54  After 
pleading insanity, the offender would receive a bifurcated trial.55  
During the second phase of the bifurcated trial, after a defendant 
was already found guilty, psychiatric testimony could be admitted to 
help the court determine the defendant’s punishment—jail time or 
hospitalization.56 
Later in State v. Provost, Minnesota recognized the problems 
that occurred when courts prohibited all psychiatric evidence 
regarding a defendant’s mens rea.57  As a result, the Minnesota 
 
REV. 955, 974 (1988) (citing S. REP. NO. 225, at 229 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3404, 3411).  The doctrine of diminished responsibility separates 
offenders into two subgroups: “a group of ‘normal’ fully culpable criminal 
offenders, and a group of mentally abnormal but sane offenders with reduced 
culpability.”  Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility 
Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 860 (1977).  A 
jury can then “mitigate the punishment of a mentally disabled but sane offender 
in any case where the jury believes that the defendant is less culpable than his 
normal counterpart who commits the same criminal act.”  Id. at 829. 
 50. Greenberg, supra note 49, at 974–75 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 577, at 14–15 & 
n.23 (1983)) (stating that use of evidence of mental abnormality to negate mens 
rea is not to be confused with diminished capacity). 
 51. See Gee, supra note 29, at §§ 3–4; see also Greenberg, supra note 49, at 977 
(“Since the passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act, federal courts have 
inconsistently interpreted it with respect to the use of psychiatric testimony to 
negate mens rea.”). 
 52. See cases cited supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 53. See State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 1982) (holding expert 
testimony is not relevant in determining premeditation or intent because intent 
must be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a particular crime, to which 
psychiatric evidence does not relate); 11 MARK B. DUNNELL, DUNNELL MINNESOTA 
DIGEST: CRIMINAL LAW § 3.02(f) (5th ed. 2004). 
 54. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02, subdiv. 5. 
 55. In a bifurcated trial, the defendant’s guilt is determined before the issue 
of mental illness.  Id. 20.02, subdiv. 7(a). 
 56. Id. 20.02, subdiv. 8(1)–(2). 
 57. See State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 103-04 (Minn. 1992). 
8
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Supreme Court created two exceptions allowing a defendant to 
introduce psychiatric testimony during the guilt phase of trial.58  
The first Provost exception permits psychiatric evidence if a 
defendant’s mental disorder, which affects his subjective state of 
mind, is inconsistent with criminal mens rea.59  The second Provost 
exception allows psychiatric evidence if the defendant has a past 
history of mental illness and the testimony could explain “the 
whole man” as he was before the crime.60  To date, neither Provost 
exception has been utilized in a criminal trial.61  
C. The Model Penal Code 
Even after the enactment of the Act, the M’Naughten rule has 
been subjected to heavy attack.  Critics primarily complain that the 
M’Naughten rule fails to consider many mental illness symptoms, 
enforces outdated and erroneous psychological theories, and 
restricts relevant expert testimony.62  Further, the M’Naughten rule 
does not exonerate someone who knows and “understands exactly 
what he is doing but because of his mental disabilities cannot stop 
himself from committing a crime.”63   
In response to these attacks, the American Law Institute (ALI) 
developed a new insanity test to replace the M’Naughten rule.64  The 
new test excuses a defendant who, because of a mental disease or 
defect, “lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law.”65  A number of jurisdictions 
have adopted the ALI’s test for criminal insanity.66  Courts have 
raved over this test’s advantages for several reasons: it is more 
realistic and conforms to the practical experience of psychiatrists, it 
moves away from the absolute requirement of total incapacity and 
 
 58. Id. at 104. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 103–04. 
 61. See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 41, State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 
227 (Minn. 2010) (No. A09-1141) (“There is no reported example of . . . [the] 
implementation [of the Provost exceptions].”).   
 62. Gee, supra note 29, § 2(a) (explaining why states have modified the 
M’Naughten rule).  
 63. Arenella, supra note 49, at 842.   
 64. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2001).  
 65. Id.  
 66. See Gee, supra note 29, § 5 (listing twenty-four states that have adopted the 
ALI’s test for criminal liability).  
9
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toward one that permits substantial incapacity, and it encourages 
maximum informational input from expert witnesses while 
preserving the jury’s role as trier of fact and ultimate decision-
maker.67   
Today, Minnesota law conflicts with the majority of 
jurisdictions, the Model Penal Code, and the American Bar 
Association standards because it does not allow psychiatric 
testimony to be admitted to disprove mens rea.68  As the Anderson 
appellants suggest, the continued use of Minnesota’s M’Naughten 
rule should be closely examined because it directly affects a 
defendant’s right to due process.69 
III. STATE V. ANDERSON 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
On October 26, 2007, the Savage Police Department received a 
phone call that a discarded purse had been found at Warren Butler 
Park in Savage, Minnesota.70  Katherine Olson’s driver’s license was 
found in the purse.71  Police contacted Olson’s roommate, who 
stated that Olson had traveled to Savage for a babysitting job that 
was advertised online.72  After reviewing Olson’s inbox, police 
discovered that Olson had responded to an e-mail request from a 
woman named “Amy” in Savage.73  “Amy” had posted online that 
she needed a babysitter for her five-year-old daughter.74  A few days 
later, police located Olson’s vehicle and found her body in the 
 
 67. State v. Nuetzel, 606 P.2d 920, 927 (Haw. 1980).  For a description of the 
ALI test’s benefits, see id. at 927–28  (quoting Hill v. State, 251 N.E.2d 429, 438 
(1969) for the proposition that the ALI’s rule provides a framework “under which 
the jury will be afforded a complete picture of the defendant’s state of mind”).   
 68. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, § 7-6.2 (1984); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.0 (1962); see also Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony as to Whether Accused had Specific Intent Necessary for 
Conviction, 16 A.L.R.4th 666 § 4 (1982) (listing jurisdictions that allow and prohibit 
psychiatric testimony to negate mens rea). 
 69. See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 21, State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 
227 (Minn. 2010) (No. A09–1141) (arguing defendant had a constitutional right 
to present his version of the facts). 
 70. State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 2010). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  “Olson had been looking for jobs as a nanny on an online service of 
classified ads and discussion forums for jobs, housing, and items for sale, along 
with personals . . . .”  Id. at 231 n.1.      
 73. Id. at 231.  
 74. Id. at 231–32. 
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trunk.75   
As police commenced their investigation, substantial evidence 
indicated that Michael Anderson was responsible for Olson’s 
death.76  Police took custody of Anderson, who later admitted to 
being present when Olson was killed.77  Anderson stated that his 
friend “thought it would be funny” to kill Olson.78  Police charged 
Anderson with second-degree intentional murder.79  A grand jury 
indicted Anderson for first-degree premeditated murder and 
second-degree intentional murder.80   
At trial, Anderson pleaded not guilty by reason of mental 
illness.81  The defense retained a psychologist and a psychiatrist, 
each of whom diagnosed Anderson as having Asperger’s.82  The 
district court ordered two mental examinations of Anderson; each 
examiner concluded that Anderson did not have Asperger’s and 
was not mentally ill or deficient.83  Anderson then withdrew his 
mental illness defense and pleaded not guilty, forgoing a bifurcated 
trial.84  Anderson then claimed that the shooting was an accident.85  
 
 75. Id. at 231.  An autopsy revealed a gunshot wound to Olson’s back, and 
injuries to Olson’s knees, nose, and forehead.  Id. at 232.  The medical examiner 
stated it was likely that Olson was shot in the back, fell forward, and hit her knees 
and head.  Id.  
 76. Id. at 231–32.  Evidence included: a hair found on Olson’s body matching 
Anderson’s DNA profile, Anderson’s fingerprints found on Olson’s belongings, 
Olson’s blood found in Anderson’s home, and the fact that the gun used to kill 
Olson matched a gun that was owned by Anderson’s parents.  Id.  Additionally, an 
analysis of Anderson’s computer showed Anderson had posted the babysitting 
advertisement and responded to Olson’s inquiry.  Id. at 232.  Within nearly one 
year, Anderson made sixty-seven postings on the online service including requests 
for female models and actresses, nude photos, a sexual encounter, babysitters, and 
car parts.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 231. 
 78. Id.   
 79. Id. at 232.  This charge was in violation of MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subdiv. 
1(1) (2008).  Id.     
 80. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 232; see also MINN. STAT. §§ 609.185(a)(1), 609.18 
(2008) (setting forth the statutory provisions for first-degree premeditated murder 
and second-degree intentional murder).   
 81. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d. at 232; see also MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (2010) (“No 
person shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime while mentally ill or 
mentally deficient so as to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or 
making a defense.”). 
 82. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d. at 232. 
 83. Id.  A district court may order a mental examination of the defendant if 
the defense notifies the prosecutor that it plans to assert a mental illness defense.  
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02, subdiv. 1(a). 
 84. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 232.  
 85. Id. at 233.  The defense presented witnesses who testified that Anderson 
11
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Additionally, the defense claimed that Asperger’s deprived 
Anderson of normal brain function, which affected his mens rea.86   
The lower court denied Anderson’s motion to admit expert 
psychiatric testimony regarding Asperger’s.87  Accordingly, 
Anderson was left to argue that he lived in an “unreal world,” and 
that the shooting was an accident.88  The jury did not believe 
Anderson’s defense and found him guilty of first-degree 
premeditated and second-degree intentional murder.89  Anderson 
was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release.90  
Anderson then appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.91  
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision 
In his appeal, Anderson argued in part that the district court 
denied him a fair trial by precluding expert psychiatric testimony 
regarding Asperger’s.92  
 
was clumsy and uncoordinated and that the gun may have accidentally discharged 
as Olson was running away.  Id.    
 86. See id. at 235 (explaining that Anderson argued that evidence of his 
Asperger’s was “necessary to explain the physical evidence of his condition, such as 
odd mannerisms, inability to empathize, show remorse, or respond properly to 
social cues”). 
 87. Id. at 233. 
 88. Id.  Anderson’s attorney argued that Anderson did the following: 
Anderson . . . lured Olson over with no clear idea of why . . . . He said 
that when she tried to leave, Anderson, who had no experience with 
women, fell back on his video game experience and pulled his father’s 
gun on her.  He said Anderson then shot her accidentally when he 
tripped or flinched.   
  He also asked jurors to consider that Anderson lives in an “unreal 
world.”   
  “. . . All we know is that this is a bizarre kid with no social skills.”   
CBS News, Craigslist Killer Gets Life Without Parole, CBSNEWS, Apr. 1, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/01/national/main4911771.shtml. 
 89. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 233.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  In addition to this issue,  
Anderson argue[d] that (1) he did not waive his Miranda rights so his 
statement to the police [regarding Olson’s murder] should have been 
suppressed; (2) the district court abused its discretion and denied him a 
fair trial when it denied his request to present expert psychiatric 
testimony on Asperger’s and its effects on him; . . . and (4) the evidence 
was insufficient to support a conviction for first-degree premeditated 
murder.   
Id.  On appeal, the court reviews evidentiary rulings of the district court, including 
the admission of expert testimony, for abuse of discretion.  State v. Peterson, 764 
N.W.2d 816, 821 (Minn. 2009).  The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
12
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First, Anderson argued that evidence of Asperger’s was 
necessary to explain his physical appearance, odd mannerisms, and 
inability to empathize.93  According to Anderson, without expert 
psychiatric testimony he was unable to educate the jury on 
Asperger’s effects, which prevented him from testifying and 
receiving a fair trial.94  
The court recognized that Anderson had “a constitutional due 
process right to present a meaningful defense.”95  However, this 
right is not unlimited.96  District courts may exclude expert 
testimony when the court finds that “the evidence is not helpful to 
the jury” or if “the probative value of such evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury.”97  The court agreed that whatever 
the probative value of the expert testimony, it was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury.98  Accordingly, the 
court rejected Anderson’s first argument.99   
Anderson’s second argument asserted that expert testimony 
regarding Asperger’s effect on brain function was necessary to 
challenge whether Anderson had the requisite mens rea for a 
murder conviction.100  Anderson argued that the court’s denial of 
psychiatric testimony precluded him from presenting evidence that 
would refute the jury’s incorrect presumption that his brain 
 
court’s decision on all arguments.  Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 243.   
 93. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 235.   
 94. Id.  The defense argued that if Anderson had testified, (1) he would 
misread the situation and give an answer that would seem odd, (2) he would be 
easily manipulated by questioning, (3) his demeanor would be misunderstood, 
and (4) his answers to questions simply would not have made any sense to the jury 
unless Asperger’s was explained by a professional.  Appellant’s Brief and 
Addendum at 27, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (No. A09-1141). 
 95. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 235. 
 96. Id.  A defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial, however, is shaped by 
the rules of evidence, which are designed to assure both fairness and reliability in 
assessing guilt or innocence.  See State v. Reese, 692 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 
2005).   
 97. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 235; MINN. R. EVID. 403, 702.   
 98. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 236. 
 99. The court relied on the lower court’s observation that there was nothing 
particularly unusual about Anderson’s physical appearance.  Id. at 235.  Further, 
Anderson failed to offer proof that Asperger’s physically affected him.  Id. 
 100. Id. at 236; see also Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 19–20, Anderson, 
789 N.W.2d 227 (No. A09-1141) (asserting that his lack of normal brain function 
and the trial court’s exclusion of psychiatric testimony denied his right to due 
process). 
13
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functioned normally.101  Accordingly, the jurors would believe that 
Anderson’s mind could intend or premeditate in the same manner 
that their minds could.102  
The court again rejected this argument.103  Minnesota law 
presumes that “defendant[s] standing trial [are] responsible for 
their acts, i.e., they have the capacity to intend what they do.”104  
Because Minnesota does not recognize the doctrine of diminished 
capacity, the jury could only find Anderson legally sane or legally 
insane—nowhere in the middle.105  The court agreed that any 
testimony implying Anderson’s mental state lies in the middle must 
be precluded to prevent the jury from discussing a diminished 
capacity defense.106   
Third, Anderson argued that his situation fell within both 
Provost exceptions, and accordingly the court should allow 
psychiatric testimony during the guilt phase of his trial.107  
Regarding the first Provost exception, Anderson argued that 
Asperger’s prevents an individual from having a guilty mind,108 
which is inconsistent with the required mens rea element of a 
crime.109  The court rejected this argument, finding that Anderson 
failed to show how Asperger’s prevents a person from 
premeditating or forming intent.110   
 
 101. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 236.   
 102. See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 19–20, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 
(No. A09-1141). 
 103. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 237.   
 104. State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 1982).   
 105. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 237 (citing State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 100 
(Minn. 1992)); see also Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 706 (espousing society’s and 
morality’s bifurcated division between “the legally sane, [and] on the other side . . 
. the legally insane”). 
 106. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 237.  Minnesota does not recognize the doctrine 
of diminished capacity or diminished responsibility.  See Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 
100.   
 107. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 237–38.  See supra text accompanying notes 59–60 
(discussing the two exceptions created by Provost).  
 108. See infra text accompanying note 153 (explaining that people with 
Asperger’s function according to their own rules).  
 109. See Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 104.   
 110. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 238.  In fact, Anderson’s own psychiatric witness 
explained that a person with Asperger’s was perfectly capable of forming intent 
and premeditation.  See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 30, Anderson, 789 
N.W.2d 227 (No. A09-1141).  The court also relied on other evidence to find his 
mind could premeditate: Anderson lured Olson to his home when nobody would 
be home; he retrieved a gun from his parents’ bedroom and manually loaded and 
cocked the gun; when Olson arrived he immediately shot her in the back (Olson’s 
blood was found in front of the home).  Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 242.   
14
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Anderson then asserted that expert psychiatric testimony was 
necessary to explain the “whole man” under the second Provost 
exception.111  However, the second Provost exception only concerns 
a defendant’s history of mental illness,112 and the court found that 
Anderson lacked a history of Asperger’s prior to this crime.113  
Because doctors diagnosed Anderson with Asperger’s after his 
incarceration, nothing indicated that Anderson had a history of 
mental illness.114  As a result, the court ruled that Anderson fell 
under neither of the Provost exceptions.115 
Finally, Anderson argued that his Asperger’s is comparable to 
other cases involving mental abnormalities where Minnesota courts 
have allowed psychiatric testimony.116  The court urged that even 
though expert testimony had been allowed in prior cases, the 
district court must still evaluate the evidence to ensure it will not 
confuse the jury.117  As the court had ruled with Anderson’s other 
three arguments, it found that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding psychiatric testimony regarding 
Asperger’s.118  Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed 
Anderson’s conviction and sentencing.119 
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE V. ANDERSON  
In Anderson, the court maintained precedent by precluding 
expert psychiatric testimony during the guilt phase of trial.120   
In doing so, the court overlooked one major issue: Anderson, 
who withdrew his mental illness defense, had no other opportunity 
to contest his mental culpability during trial.121  It was possible for 
the jury to find Anderson legally sane, yet still mentally incapable of 
 
 111. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 238; Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 104.     
 112. See State v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 679 (Minn. 2007).  
 113. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 239.   
 114. Anderson’s primary care physician in 2002 noted that there were “no 
current behavioral or emotional concerns.”  Id.  However, Anderson argued that 
his lack of an Asperger’s diagnosis prior to trial should not be held against him in 
determining whether the second exception should apply.  Id.   
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 239 n.10.   
 117. Id.; see MINN. R. EVID. 402, 403.  
 118. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 239. 
 119. Id. at 243.   
 120. Id. at 236–37; see cases cited supra note 9.   
 121. A defendant who does not plead insanity does not receive a bifurcated 
trial.  See supra text accompanying notes 55–56.  Thus, Anderson received only one 
phase of trial: the guilt phase.  See Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 237.  
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premeditating murder.122  The court required the prosecution to 
prove both the physical and mental elements of a crime, yet at the 
same time precluded Anderson from presenting evidence that 
would contest his mental culpability.123  As a result, Anderson did 
not receive a fair trial.   
The analysis that follows argues that denying psychiatric 
testimony violates a defendant’s constitutional right to present a 
complete defense.  The analysis begins by further explaining the 
Anderson court’s decision to exclude psychiatric testimony.124  The 
analysis then explains why Anderson did not receive a fair trial,125 
followed by additional considerations the Anderson court should 
have contemplated in its opinion.126  These considerations include: 
a defendant’s due process rights, inconsistencies in Minnesota’s 
rules of evidence, and the consequences this decision has on the 
public due to the law’s refusal to catch up with psychiatry.127  
Finally, the analysis ends by discussing alternative methods for 
admitting psychiatric testimony, and suggests an approach that may 
be more practical for Minnesota courts.128 
A. Why Minnesota Courts Exclude Psychiatric Testimony  
Courts know the risk involved in allowing psychiatric testimony 
during the guilt phase of trial.  The risk is that a guilty offender 
may walk free.129  To avoid this, Minnesota courts refuse to 
recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity.130  Consequently, 
 
 122. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a jury may have found a 
defendant to have been mentally incapable of the premeditation required to 
support a first-degree murder verdict, and yet not have found that same defendant 
to have been legally insane.  See State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 766 (Minn. 1990) 
(Wahl, J., dissenting) (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794 (1952)).   
 123. See Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 237.   
 124. See infra Part IV.A.  
 125. See infra Part IV.B. 
 126. See infra Part IV.C.  
 127. See infra Part IV.C.1–3. 
 128. See infra Part IV.D. 
 129. If expert testimony convinces the jury that the defendant’s mind was not 
capable of intending or premeditating murder, the defendant must be acquitted.  
See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.02, subdiv. 7(b)(3).  Alternatively, if evidence regarding 
defendant’s mental capacity is only introduced after the defendant has been 
found guilty, the court can commence a proceeding to commit the defendant to a 
hospital.  See id.  20.02, subdiv. 8(1).  For a discussion on the purpose of the 
insanity defense, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 371–73 (4th ed. 2003).   
 130. State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 237 (Minn. 2010) (citing State v. 
Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Minn. 1992)). 
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defendants must take full responsibility for the crime that has been 
committed regardless of differences in upbringing, mental 
condition, or environmental background, so long as they 
understand the nature of their act and that it was wrong.131  
Without the doctrine of diminished capacity, an offender is either 
wholly sane or wholly insane, and criminal liability cannot be 
mitigated based on the degree of sanity an offender possesses.132   
Quite simply, Minnesota courts find psychiatric testimony to be 
a waste of time.  Psychiatrists do not view mental health in black 
and white terms (sane or insane).133  Rather, psychiatrists view 
mental illness as a series of degrees, ranging from the mild 
psychopath to the extreme psychotic.134  Courts are also concerned 
about the credibility of psychiatric testimony, questioning whether 
psychiatrists can reliably determine what level of sanity an offender 
possesses.135  This being so, judges fear their courtrooms will flood 
with uncertain testimony from mental health professionals 
constantly disputing the degree of sanity an offender possesses.136   
Minnesota courts also believe that the allowance of psychiatric 
testimony is overshadowed by the risk of confusing juries when 
determining the legal elements of intent and premeditation.137  
When juries determine criminal intent and premeditation, they can 
only look at physical evidence—what the defendant says and does 
in the light of all surrounding circumstances.138  The jury is then 
 
 131. See Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 108 (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (discussing why 
she would not adopt the diminished responsibility doctrine).   
 132. See id. at 104. 
 133. See State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982) (citing Holloway 
v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945)). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Courts fear that mental health professionals are not reliable and cannot 
know a defendant’s true state of mind with certainty.  Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 100.  
See infra note 210 (describing courts’ skepticism of psychiatric testimony).  
 136. “Congress amended Rule 704 to ‘eliminate the confusing spectacle of 
competing expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions as to 
the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact.’”  Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 
100–01 (citing United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986)).  
 137. See Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705–06 (reasoning that intent and 
premeditation are separate from capacity and thus need to be presented 
accordingly).   
 138. Courts have noted that it is not easy to prove intent because the jury must 
examine at a later time the state of a man’s mind at that particular moment.  
Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 98 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5, at 317–18 (2d ed. 1986)).  “Naturally, what he 
does and what foreseeably results from his deeds have a bearing on what he may 
have had in mind.”  Id.  
17
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asked to draw upon its sensory perceptions, life experiences, and 
common sense to determine whether that act was indeed 
intentional.139  
Minnesota believes that the legal definitions of intent and 
premeditation are outside a psychiatrist’s practice.140  Criminal law 
is only interested in whether a certain act is legal or illegal, and 
whether the act is performed out of conscious volition (i.e., 
intentionally).141  The law is not interested in the reasons 
explaining why a crime was committed.142  As psychiatric testimony 
tends to explain why a defendant committed a crime, courts view it 
as irrelevant to the legal definitions of intent and premeditation.  
Accordingly, since psychiatric testimony is irrelevant, a court’s 
decision to bar the testimony does not deny the defendant a fair 
trial.143  
B. Anderson Did Not Receive a Fair Trial  
Although longstanding precedent suggests otherwise, 
Minnesota’s decision to bar psychiatric testimony did deny 
Anderson a fair trial.  When the rules of evidence preclude a 
 
 139. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705.  
 140. State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1990) (“Because psychiatric 
evidence ‘does not relate to the physical evidence upon which the jury is to 
determine the issue of intent,’ it is irrelevant to that issue and cannot be admitted 
. . . .”).  This point is further exemplified in the following hypothetical:  
Mr. Fanatic believes that God has ordered him to kill his neighbor 
because the neighbor is an agent of the devil.  Mr. Fanatic buys a gun and 
ammunition, invites his neighbor over for tea, and calmly blows his 
brains out, killing him instantly.  Psychiatrists testify that Mr. Fanatic was 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia . . . .  Yet the same evidence of 
mental abnormality would not refute the existence of either the specific 
intent to kill or premeditation and deliberation.  Mr. Fanatic certainly 
intended to kill and his objective acts clearly evidenced a preconceived 
design to effectuate that intent in a calm, deliberate manner.   
Arenella, supra note 49, at 833–34.  
 141. See BERNARD L. DIAMOND, THE PSYCHIATRIST IN THE COURTROOM 107 
(Jacques M. Quen ed., 1994).   
 142. For example:  
[I]t is murder in the first degree to kill a man for the purpose of robbing 
him.  It is also murder in the first degree for a physician to kill a patient 
dying of cancer by administering an overdose of morphine in order to 
put him out of his pain and suffering.  That one act is performed for bad 
reasons, the other for good, does not alter the identity of the crimes.  
Id. 
 143. See Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705 (“[P]sychiatric evidence is of no value at 
this part of the trial since it does not relate to the physical evidence upon which 
the jury is to determine the issue of intent.”). 
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defendant from contesting an element of a crime, the 
prosecution’s evidence on that issue becomes uncontestable as a 
matter of law, and the defendant is deprived of the presumption of 
innocence.144  Interestingly, the rules of evidence typically favor the 
admission of relevant evidence.145  In this case, however, the rules 
were used to exclude relevant evidence, raising concerns as to 
whether the district court abused its discretion by denying 
psychiatric testimony.   
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Anderson, 
the court asserted that Anderson “may” have Asperger’s.146  Despite 
this assertion, the court refused to allow any type of psychiatric 
testimony regarding Asperger’s—specifically testimony stating that 
the disorder prevented Anderson from forming intent or 
premeditation at the time of Olson’s death.147  Notably, this is not 
the type of evidence Anderson sought to introduce.148  Rather, 
Anderson sought to admit psychiatric testimony that would have 
explained Asperger’s general effects and helped the jury 
understand the defendant’s evidence regarding mens rea.149  Since 
the court conceded that Anderson “may” have had Asperger’s, this 
psychiatric evidence should have been admitted because it would 
have helped the jury understand the mental defect Anderson “may” 
 
 144. See Brom, 463 N.W.2d at 766 (Wahl, J., dissenting) (citing Hendershott v. 
People, 653 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982)).  But cf. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705 
(holding expert psychiatric opinion regarding intent to kill, when not used to 
establish an insanity defense, is inadmissible). 
 145. The rules favor the admission of relevant evidence by requiring a 
determination that its probative value be “substantially” outweighed by the 
dangers listed in the rule before relevant evidence will be excluded.  See MINN. R. 
EVID. 403. 
 146. “The district court noted that it is disputed whether Anderson has 
Asperger’s, but after examining the evidence in a light most favorable to 
Anderson, concluded that he ‘may’ have Asperger’s.”  State v. Anderson, 789 
N.W.2d 227, 235 n.6 (Minn. 2010). 
 147. Id. at 236.   
 148. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 8, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (No. A09-1141) 
(stating that the defendant did not wish to introduce psychiatric testimony 
regarding the ultimate question on degrees of sanity, diminished capacity, or 
gradations of sanity).   
 149. Id.  Anderson argued that at a minimum, psychiatric evidence was 
necessary for the jury to understand the following: (1) why he acted the way he did 
in the courtroom, (2) that Asperger’s persons are easily manipulated (even during 
questioning), (3) those who suffer from Asperger’s have a different understanding 
of what statements are socially appropriate, (4) a general understanding of how 
Asperger’s individuals relate to others socially, and (5) that Asperger’s individuals 
tend to give responses that are not appropriate for the situation.  Appellant’s Brief 
and Addendum at 34, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (No. A09-1141).     
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have had.150   
If Anderson had been allowed to present psychiatric testimony, 
the expert would have explained how Asperger’s affected 
Anderson’s mannerisms in a way that made him seem odd and 
even scary.151  The expert would have explained that Asperger’s 
impairs an individual’s ability to socialize, communicate, 
empathize, or understand and respond properly to social cues.152  
Ultimately, the jury would have been left with the understanding 
that individuals with Asperger’s may live according to their own set 
of social standards and behavioral rules; so while they believe that 
their conduct is appropriate, it is socially unacceptable to others.153   
Despite the defense’s efforts, the Anderson court believed this 
general information was the kind of lay evidence that the jury could 
determine without the aid of an expert.154  While most individuals 
have heard of Asperger’s, many do not know its effects because it is 
a rare and misunderstood developmental disorder.155  Only an 
expert could convey to the jury how Asperger’s affects an 
individual’s outward appearance and inward perception.156  
Without this testimony, the jury likely perceived Anderson as a 
cold-blooded killer.  The jury was instructed to base their verdict on 
what they believed Anderson said and did at the time of the 
crime.157  Jurors base their opinions on what they see in front of 
them.158  The jury assesses the defendant’s demeanor, facial 
 
 150. See infra text accompanying note 191.  
 151. See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 25, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (No. 
A09-1141).     
 152. See ATTWOOD, supra note 10, at 12.  
 153. See Brian Wauhop, Comment, Mindblindness: Three Nations Approach the 
Special Case of the Criminally Accused Individual with Asperger’s Syndrome, 27 PENN. ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 959, 959 (2009). 
 154. To be admissible, expert testimony must help a juror understand 
evidence that an inexperienced juror may be unable to form a correct judgment 
on without the expert’s testimony.  See State v. Pirsig, 670 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2003) (holding that expert testimony on data collected by a combine 
monitor was helpful to the jury and thus the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing it). 
 155. While Asperger’s was studied and described over sixty years ago, only 
recently has the diagnosis gained widespread acceptance.  See ATTWOOD, supra 
note 10, at 35–36, 38 (describing the background of Asperger’s).  
 156. See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 32, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (No. 
A09-1141).   
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 138–39 (detailing what a jury must 
consider in determining a defendant’s guilt).  
 158. The reality is that jurors consider a defendant’s demeanor in their 
decisions.  One commentator explained:  
20
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expressions, and any behaviors that seem odd or eccentric.159  Even 
the trial judge declared to Anderson: “You have shown no remorse, 
no empathy, and I have no sympathy for you.”160  Surely, evidence 
relaying that Asperger’s impairs an individual’s ability to empathize 
and respond properly to social cues would have helped the jury 
perceive Anderson differently.161 
Additionally, psychiatric testimony describing Asperger’s 
would have influenced how the jury would have portrayed 
Anderson if he had testified.  At trial, Anderson did not take the 
stand because his attorneys feared his answers would not make 
sense unless Asperger’s had been explained.162  It would have been 
easy to manipulate Anderson into incriminating himself on the 
stand.163  Further, if Anderson testified that he did not think Olson 
 
Jurors scrutinize [a defendant’s] every move, attaching deep importance 
to a quick glance or a passing remark—details a nonjuror might consider 
insignificant.  High-profile criminal trials show that jurors use a 
defendant’s courtroom demeanor to determine his sincerity and 
culpability.  The impression that the defendant makes on the jury can 
thus have an enormous impact on the outcome of the trial. 
Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 573, 575–76 (2008). 
 159. Id.  
 160. Abby Simons, Craigslist Killer Gets Life Without Parole, STAR TRIB., Apr. 1, 
2009, http://www.startribune.com/local/south/42273197.html.   
 161. See State v. Burr, 948 A.2d 627, 629, 633 (N.J. 2008) (holding that expert 
testimony on Asperger’s was necessary to explain to the jury the defendant’s 
mannerisms and inappropriate behaviors).  
 162. Appellant’s Brief and Addendum at 27, State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 
227 (Minn. 2010) (No. A09-1141).  Appellant provided the following hypothetical:  
If John walks up to Mary, a total stranger, on the street and seriously 
proposes marriage the expected reaction of an onlooker that observed 
the situation was that John must have been pulling a prank and could not 
have in anyway been serious.  If John’s friend came up to the onlooker 
and insisted that John was fully serious, the onlooker would think John’s 
friend was in on the prank and that neither of them had any credibility.  
If the onlooker was first told about Asperger’s and how those with 
Asperger’s don’t understand the same social clues as the average person 
they will have the specialized knowledge necessary to evaluating the 
situation fairly.  Now if John’s friend walks up to the onlooker and 
explains that John has Asperger’s and that John was fully serious when he 
proposed marriage, the onlooker will be in a better position to judge the 
situation.  
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 9–10, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (No. A09-1141).   
 163.  In State v. Burr, the expert testimony noted that there are two handicaps 
with respect to a patient with Asperger’s testifying in court.  921 A.2d 1135, 1146 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007), aff’d, 948 A.2d 627 (N.J. 2008).  The first is that 
the jury assesses the person’s odd demeanor and might correlate this with guilt.  
Id.  The second is that the person may suffer from sensory overload and become 
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would come to his home, the jury would have thought Anderson 
was lying.  Proof existed that Anderson had listened to a voicemail 
left by Olson shortly before she arrived at his home.164  However, 
with expert testimony explaining that Asperger’s impairs a person’s 
ability to think ahead to the next stage in a process, the jury would 
certainly be left to question whether Anderson had in fact 
premeditated Olson’s murder at the time of the crime.165   
One may question how admitting psychiatric testimony 
regarding Asperger’s could have hurt the prosecution’s case.  Little 
evidence existed to prove Anderson’s innocence.166  Since a jury 
can either use or disregard expert testimony, why not allow it?167  
Although the court believed the expert testimony would confuse 
the jury, this is likely untrue.  Rather, the most confusing aspect of 
this case is likely how the defendant could commit such an act.168  
This is reflected in the trial judge’s own statements: “And why did 
you do this?  You are the only one who knows.  I do not pretend to 
understand it.”169  Although Minnesota asserts it has no interest in 
why a defendant commits a crime, it should.170  Why a crime was 
committed influences a jury’s decision in determining intent.171  In 
a fair system, a jury should be presented with all relevant 
information before making the serious decision of sentencing a 
human being to life in prison.   
C. Minnesota Should Not Exclude Psychiatric Testimony 
Withholding relevant testimony conflicts with the long-
standing philosophy that the legal system has faith in the jury’s 
 
confused under cross-examination.  Id. 
 164. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 242.  
 165. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 17, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (No. A09-
1141).  “I didn’t think about it,” is a typical answer from one with Asperger’s, 
which is inconsistent with the pertinent mens rea of intent and premeditation.  Id.   
 166. See supra note 76 (listing the substantial evidence proving Anderson’s 
guilt).   
 167. A jury is not bound to expert testimony.  DeMars v. State, 352 N.W.2d 13, 
16 (Minn. 1984).   
 168. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 19, Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (No. A09-1141).   
 169. Id.; see also The Associated Press, ‘Craigslist Killer’ Michael John Anderson Gets 
Life in Murder of Katherine Olson, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 3, 2009, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/04/02/2009-04-
02_craigslist_killer_michael_john_anderson_.html (directly quoting the judge).  
 170. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing that criminal law 
does not care why a crime was committed).   
 171. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  
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ability to evaluate evidence.172  Because the law requires proof of 
subjective intent or premeditation, the jury must determine a 
defendant’s actual state of mind, and relevant evidence regarding 
that state of mind must be admitted.173  Logically, because 
“psychology” is defined as the science of the mind,174 one who 
studies it may have relevant information about the mind that is 
helpful to the jury.175   
Unlike Minnesota’s approach, many jurisdictions hold that the 
exclusion of psychiatric testimony is a violation of a defendant’s 
due process rights.176  Their reasoning is derived from the most 
basic premise of criminal law: without a guilty mind, there can be 
no criminal liability.177  Ultimately, these jurisdictions believe that 
all relevant evidence, which includes psychiatric testimony, should 
be received so the jury can better assess the case and determine 
where the truth lies.   
1. Defendant’s Right to Present a Complete Defense 
When accused of a crime, a defendant has constitutional rights 
to present a complete defense.178  Both the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments protect these rights.179  The deep principles 
 
 172. See JAMES GOBERT, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART AND SCIENCE OF 
SELECTING A JURY, § 1:1 (2010).    
 173. See Arenella, supra note 49, at 833.   
 174. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1004 (11th ed. 2003). 
 175. See Arenella, supra note 49, at 833. 
 176. See Gulbis, supra note 68, § 3(a) (listing the following jurisdictions that 
allow psychiatric testimony: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin).  
 177. See LAFAVE, supra note 129, at 252–56.   
 178. See generally 8 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 
SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 32.4 (3d ed. 2010) (describing when defense 
evidence cannot be constitutionally excluded). 
 179. The Sixth Amendment states:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; 
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to 
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.   
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 6–7 (amended 1988) 
(creating the same constitutional rights).  The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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underlying both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “are the 
protection of innocence and the pursuit of truth.”180  Ultimately, 
these amendments protect citizens from erroneous verdicts and 
provide a defendant with the chance to be fully heard in court 
before his liberty is taken.181 
The Sixth Amendment ensures that all defendants have the 
right to a speedy, public, and fair trial.182  A fair trial ensures that all 
defendants have notice of the crime they are charged with and an 
opportunity to be heard.183  This includes a right to call witnesses in 
the defendant’s favor.184  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause requires a full and fair hearing before an impartial 
tribunal.185  The Due Process Clause encourages defendants to put 
the prosecution’s case to a meaningful, adversarial test, where the 
defendant can rebut each element of the charged crime with 
competent and credible evidence.186  It seems that the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments closely intertwine, as the right to offer the 
testimony of witnesses is, in plain terms, the right to present the 
defendant’s version of the facts.187   
Notably, a defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights have limits.  The legislature is free to restrict these 
constitutional rights so long as the restrictions are not arbitrary.188  
 
 180. Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 642 
(1996).   
 181. Id. (“A defendant will be convicted only if the people of the community 
(via the jury) believe the criminal accusation . . . .”).  The right to due process 
protects one accused of a crime from being denied his liberty without a chance to 
present his defense.  See MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 178 (“[T]he right to 
present a full defense is a constitutional one, an aspect of due process.”).  
 182. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (amended 1988).   
 183. See sources cited supra note 182. 
 184. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987). 
 185. See 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1495 (2011).  
 186. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 
485 (1984); 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1495 (2011). 
 187. Martin A. Hewett, Note, A More Reliable Right to Present a Defense: The 
Compulsory Process Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 96 GEO. L.J. 273, 308 
(2007) (“Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses 
for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own 
witnesses to establish a defense.” (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 
(1967))). 
 188. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55–56.  As stated in the MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES:   
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that defense evidence may not 
constitutionally be excluded under a number of rules it deemed 
“arbitrary”: 1) A rule excluding accomplices as defense witnesses, 2) A 
rule against impeachment of one’s own witness, 3) A rule excluding 
evidence that confession was coerced, 4) A rule forbidding a defendant’s 
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At the federal level, a defendant’s right to present witnesses has 
been restricted to exclude expert witnesses from stating whether 
the defendant had the mental state or condition constituting an 
element of the crime charged (i.e., intent or premeditation).189  
However, an expert may testify if he or she is only asked to explain 
a defendant’s mental disease or defect.190   
Conversely, Minnesota’s rules of evidence do not preclude 
expert witnesses from testifying.191  “Normally, experts are 
permitted to express opinions because they are dealing with a field 
of knowledge unfamiliar to others and particularly to the [jury].”192  
However, Minnesota courts reserve the right to exclude certain 
testimony.193  Typically, the crucial criterion courts use in 
determining the admissibility of expert testimony is whether the 
testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact.194   
In Anderson, a psychiatrist’s testimony would have been helpful 
to the jury.195  Although this crime was senseless, the court should 
not have concluded which evidence was necessary to Anderson’s 
defense.  The ultimate question of guilt must be decided by a jury, 
after it is presented all evidence.  To deny the jury from hearing all 
 
hypnotically refreshed testimony, 5) A rule conditioning admissibility of 
alternate perpetrator evidence on the relative weakness of the 
prosecution’s evidence. 
MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 178 (footnotes omitted).  
 189. See 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 704:2 (6th 
ed. 2010). 
 190. For example: 
Where lack of mental capacity is asserted, presumably the expert may 
answer the questions “Was the accused suffering from a mental disease or 
defect?”, “Explain the characteristics of the mental disease and defect.”, 
“Was his act the product of that disease or defect?” and “What is the 
effect of the disease or defect on the person’s mental state?”  However 
the expert may not answer the question “Was the accused able to 
appreciate the nature and quality of his act?” or “Was the accused able to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts?” 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 191. MINN. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify . . . .”).  
 192. Sanchez v. Waldrup, 271 Minn. 419, 426, 136 N.W.2d 61, 65 (1965).  
 193. See MINN. R. EVID. 403.  Rule 403 sets forth the appropriate considerations 
that must be addressed in resolving challenges to the admissibility of relevant 
evidence.  See id.  The rule creates a balancing test: probative value is balanced 
against other considerations of policy, fairness, and convenience.  Id.  
 194. See State v. Carillo, 623 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing 
State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Minn. 1997)).   
 195. See supra notes 152–53, 161–65 and accompanying text.  
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relevant evidence is to deny it an opportunity to make a fair 
determination of guilt.   
2. Inconsistent Rules of Evidence  
Although not allowed in this case, psychiatric testimony has 
been allowed by Minnesota courts in both non-criminal196 and 
criminal cases in the past.197  This inconsistency that the courts have 
created over admissible psychiatric evidence not only causes 
confusion, but gives the courts too much power.  Courts repeatedly 
allow expert testimony to explain battered women’s syndrome,198 
sexual abuse syndrome,199 and post-traumatic stress disorder.200  
 
 196. See State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Minn. 1978) (admitting expert 
psychiatric testimony on issue of whether defendant was capable of knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver); Parrish v. Peoples, 214 Minn. 589, 595, 9 
N.W.2d 225, 229 (1943) (admitting psychiatric testimony to determine mental 
capacity to make deeds or will); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 369 N.W.2d 26, 28, 30 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1985) (admitting expert psychiatric testimony to determine whether 
defendant had capacity to enter into a contract).  
 197. See State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn. 1995) (determining that 
a clinical psychologist could testify as to nature of schizoid personality disorder); 
State v. Holm, 322 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. 1982) (admitting expert psychiatric 
testimony on whether defendant would have difficulty in assessing the nature of 
her conduct was admissible in prosecution for criminal sexual conduct in the third 
degree); State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 334, 246 N.W.2d 48, 52 (1976) (permitting 
state-retained psychiatrist to give opinion on whether the defendant accused of 
attempted second-degree murder knew the nature of his act or that it was wrong 
was not error). 
 198. In prosecutions relating to injuries or death of minor children, it is 
proper to introduce medical testimony relating to “battered child syndrome” and 
“battering parent syndrome.”  See State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 279, 204 N.W.2d 
404, 408 (1973).  In one case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony on battered 
woman syndrome in a prosecution for attempted murder, burglary, kidnapping, 
and assault.  The testimony explained why the victim recanted her prior out-of-
court description and helped the jury understand behavior that would have 
otherwise undermined the victim’s credibility.  Notably, the court limited the 
scope of expert testimony to a description of the syndrome and its characteristics.  
See State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d 653, 661–62 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).   
 199. See State v. McCoy, 400 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on 
“sexual abuse syndrome,” the typical behavioral characteristics of child victims of 
sexual abuse). 
 200. For example, in State v. Sanford, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found it 
was an error for the trial court to refuse to allow the defendant’s expert to testify 
about the defendant’s post-traumatic stress disorder.  No. A07-1402, 2008 WL 
4776713, at *2–*3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2008).  This refusal was not harmless 
because the expert’s testimony would have provided a reasonable alternative 
explanation for the defendant’s behavior.  Id. at *3. 
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Courts have even gone so far as to admit expert testimony on 
voluntary intoxication to disprove a defendant’s mens rea.201   
Defendants frequently argue that because evidence of 
voluntary intoxication is admissible to disprove mens rea, evidence 
of mental illness should be admissible as well.202  Experts are free to 
testify whether a defendant was intoxicated, yet experts cannot state 
if a defendant has mental abnormalities.203  Judges have even 
expressed their disbelief by stating:  
Neither logic nor justice can tolerate a jurisprudence that 
defines the elements of an offense as requiring a mental 
state such that one defendant can properly argue that his 
voluntary drunkenness removed his capacity to form the 
specific intent but another defendant is inhibited from a 
submission of his contention that an abnormal mental 
condition, for which he was in no way responsible, 
negated his capacity to form a particular specific intent, 
even though the condition did not exonerate him from all 
criminal responsibility.204  
It is troubling to imagine that if Anderson was intoxicated, rather 
than suffering from Asperger’s, expert testimony about his 
intoxication could be admitted for the jury to consider in 
determining intent and premeditation.205   
Additionally, the admissibility of psychiatric testimony in the 
 
 201. Although voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime, “it may in many 
instances be relevant to the issue of intent.”  Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 
943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1958).  Evidence of intoxication may be taken into 
consideration on whether specific intent has been formed.  MINN. STAT. § 609.075 
(2010).  In Minnesota, voluntary intoxication is a defense if specific intent is an 
essential element of the crime in question.  See City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 306 
Minn. 462, 466, 238 N.W.2d 851, 854 (1976) (holding voluntary intoxication is not 
a defense to traffic offenses because such acts do not require a specific intent). 
 202. See State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 102 (Minn. 1992) (citing United 
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1972), superseded by statute, Insanity 
Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402(a), 98 Stat. 2057, as 
recognized in Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 575 (1994)).  
 203. See State v. Fratzke, 354 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Minn. 1984) (allowing 
defendant to present expert witness stating defendant was intoxicated the night of 
the crime).  However, the expert may not give opinion testimony on how this 
intoxication may diminish the defendant’s capacity to form specific intent.  Id. at 
409.  
 204. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 999.  Minnesota courts stated that this contention is 
invalid because opinion testimony on whether a defendant’s intoxication has 
rendered the defendant incapable of forming the requisite mens rea is not 
admissible.  See Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 102.   
 205. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.  
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second phase of a bifurcated trial is problematic.206  Here, 
psychiatric testimony is allowed to help the jury determine whether 
the defendant was “laboring under such a defect of reason . . . as 
not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.”207  
Arguably, psychiatric testimony related to this standard will not be 
any more helpful, reliable, or relevant than psychiatric testimony 
would be on the issue of intent or premeditation.208  If psychiatric 
testimony is allowed under one standard, logic compels the other’s 
admissibility as well.209   
3. The Law’s Need to Catch Up to Psychiatry  
As an awareness of mental health issues progresses, the law will 
need to progress with it.  Historically, courts did not trust expert 
psychiatric testimony, either because they did not believe 
psychiatrists could give credible evidence, or because the courts 
believed that the psychiatrists had secret hidden agendas.210  We no 
longer live in the days where mental health is regarded as an 
uncertainty.211  Psychiatry is a legitimate science that is reliable and 
credible.  Today, we have physical evidence to prove a defendant’s 
mental state: medical tests, scans, and trained doctors who can 
diagnose mental diseases.  In fact, when assessing patients, 
psychiatrists look at physical evidence—what the defendant says 
and does—and match those actions with mental abnormalities that 
they are trained to diagnose.212  
 
 206. See Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 107 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).   
 207. MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (2010).  
 208. See Provost, 490 N.W.2d at 107 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).   
 209. Id. 
 210. “[A] careful reading of Bouwman [(which precluded psychiatric 
testimony)] indicates that [the] real concern about the admissibility of psychiatric 
evidence . . . was not only its relevance but also its reliability.”  Provost, 490 N.W.2d 
at 106 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).  Judge David Bazelon once stated: “Psychiatry, I 
suppose, is the ultimate wizardry.  My experience has shown that in no case is it 
more difficult to elicit productive and reliable expert testimony than in cases that 
call on the knowledge and practice of psychiatry . . . .”  Norman G. Poythress, Jr., 
Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 201, 204 
(1977). 
 211. See supra notes 196–200 (listing cases where Minnesota courts have trusted 
psychiatric testimony to aid the jury in evaluating evidence).  
 212. Mental health professionals use the Gillberg test to diagnose some 
Asperger’s individuals.  See ATTWOOD, supra note 10, at 37.  This test considers 
whether the individual has the following: (1) social impairments, such as 
difficulties interacting with peers or understanding social cues; (2) narrow 
interests; (3) compulsive need for introducing routines and interests; (4) speech 
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The decision in Anderson is particularly harmful to society 
because it creates a blanket holding that denies all individuals with 
Asperger’s the possibility of admitting psychiatric testimony to 
disprove they possessed a guilty mind.  Studies show that 1.5 to 
2.4% of prisoners have Asperger’s.213  This suggests that Asperger’s 
individuals are slipping through the cracks in criminal 
prosecutions, which may be because they are convicted based on 
the peculiar effects of their disorder, rather than their legally 
culpable conduct.214   
Notably, Asperger’s is a developmental disorder, not a mental 
illness.215  Despite the fact that Asperger’s patients may not be 
legally insane, their mental culpability to commit a criminal offense 
may still be questioned.216  People with Asperger’s frequently 
misunderstand social cues and cannot comprehend that other 
people have different emotional reactions to the same event.217  
Accordingly, those with Asperger’s who have committed an offense 
quickly confess and justify their actions because they cannot 
understand what all the fuss is about; to them, their actions were 
logical, justified, and appropriate.218  This is legally significant 
because it prevents Asperger’s individuals from perceiving and 
understanding the effect their conduct has on others.219  If an 
individual completed the physical element of a crime, but the 
individual had no idea how his or her conduct might affect others, 
then the individual did not intend the particular outcome of his or 
her conduct.220   
 
and language peculiarities, such as delayed speech development or superficially 
perfect expressive language; (5) non-verbal communication problems; and (6) 
motor clumsiness.  Id.  
 213. See Wauhop, supra note 153, at 960 (citing Barbara G. Haskins & J. Arturo 
Silva, Asperger’s Disorder and Criminal Behavior: Forensic-Psychiatric Considerations, 34 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCH. L. 374, 377, 382 (2006)).  
 214. There are types of crimes that are relatively more common due to the 
nature of Asperger’s.  See ATTWOOD, supra note 10, at 335–38.  One with Asperger’s 
may stew over many years over past bullying or injustices and seek resolution and 
revenge by illegal means.  Id. at 335.  “The social naivety and immaturity of 
adolescents with Asperger’s syndrome can also make them vulnerable to being ‘set 
up’ by peers, who encourage them to commit an offence.”  Id.  
 215. Id. at 332.  
 216. The M’Naghten insanity defense requires that the offender not know the 
nature of his act or that it was wrong at the time of committing the criminal act.  
See MINN. STAT. § 611.026 (2010). 
 217. See ATTWOOD, supra note 10, at 339. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Wauhop, supra note 153, at 963. 
 220. Id.  “‘Intentionally’” means that the actor either has a purpose to do the 
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While Minnesota lags behind, other jurisdictions have 
acknowledged the importance of admitting psychiatric testimony in 
cases regarding Asperger’s.  For example, in State v. Burr, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held “that the trial court misapplied its 
discretion in determining that Asperger’s Disorder was not relevant 
to any of the issues in the case.”221  The New Jersey court held that 
testimony regarding Asperger’s would help explain the defendant’s 
inappropriate behavior with children and his strange demeanor in 
the courtroom.222  More so, had the psychiatric expert been 
permitted to testify, it might have encouraged the defendant to 
testify in his own defense, since the jury would be less likely to view 
his conduct on the witness stand as suggestive of guilt.223   
As other jurisdictions continue to utilize the advancements in 
psychiatry and recognize that Asperger’s affects the mental element 
of a crime, Minnesota should note the positive effects of these cases 
and modify its rules accordingly.  After all, current estimates 
suggest that approximately one in every 250 people suffer from 
Asperger’s.224  As Asperger’s becomes more prevalent, courts may 
be faced with more cases concerning these individuals’ mental 
culpability and the required mens rea element of a criminal act.  It 
is not fair to hold these individuals to the same standard as those 
with normal cognition, who truly intend the outcome of their 
conduct.   
D. A New Approach for Minnesota   
As discussed, courts in other jurisdictions have found that 
testimony relating to Asperger’s is relevant when determining 
criminal mens rea.225  While numerous approaches regarding the 
 
thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, 
if successful, will cause that result.”  MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 9(3) (2010).   
 221. See State v. Burr, 921 A.2d 1135, 1149 (N.J. 2007), aff’d, 948 A.2d 627 (N.J. 
2008). 
 222. See id. at 1142, 1150.  Burr appeared in court with a bag over his head.  Id. 
at 1142 n.5.  “When the court questioned his dress and demeanor, defendant 
answered by quoting from the Book of Deuteronomy.”  Id.  Psychiatric testimony 
regarding Burr’s Asperger’s should have been admitted to help the jury get a 
better understanding of the defendant’s inappropriate conduct of placing 
children on his lap while he taught piano lessons.  Id. at 1149.   
 223. See id. at 1151.  The defendant stated, “I always say something that irritates 
people and gives the wrong impression. . . . I can’t trust myself to speak. . . . I 
always say things that embarrass myself and upset other people.”  Id.  
 224. ATTWOOD, supra note 10, at 46.  
 225. See, for example, text accompanying supra notes 221–22.  
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admission of psychiatric testimony exist, U.S. jurisdictions typically 
use one of three alternatives: the mens rea model, the diminished 
capacity model, or the exclusion of psychiatric testimony altogether 
(Minnesota’s approach).226  This section describes these alternatives 
and how each would have affected Anderson’s trial.  Based on these 
approaches, this section concludes by offering a solution that is 
practical and fair.227   
1. The Mens Rea Model  
The mens rea model asks the jury to consider whether a sane 
defendant’s mental abnormality prevented him from forming the 
required mental state prescribed by statute.228  If a mens rea 
defense is successful, it will reduce the offense to one with a lesser 
maximum punishment.  With this model, evidence of mental 
abnormality is admissible to the extent that it proves or disproves 
the defendant’s state of mind.229  The mens rea model is supported 
by many psychiatrists and an increasing number of state courts 
because it offers a logical way of relating medical data about the 
accused’s mental state to legal categories of criminal liability.230  
Of course, there are problems with the mens rea model.  One 
major complication is the model’s assumption that psychiatric 
analysis is directly relevant to the criminal law’s definition of 
premeditation or intent.231  This is not the case.  Often, expert 
testimony does not adequately relate to the law’s interpretation of 
intent and premeditation.232  “In fact, most mentally abnormal 
offenders are fully capable of thinking about their criminal act 
before they do it, turning it over in their minds, planning the act, 
and then performing it in accordance with their preconceived 
 
 226. For an exhaustive list citing the states and cases that have adopted either 
the mens rea model or the diminished capacity model, see Travis H.D. Lewin, 
Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes Other than the Defense of Insanity, 26 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1105–15 (1975).   
 227. See infra Part IV.D.3. 
 228. Arenella, supra note 49, at 828.  “In practice, defendants raise this defense 
most frequently in homicide cases to show that their mental abnormality 
prevented them from premeditating . . . or possessing an intent to kill.”  Id. at 828–
29 (citation omitted).    
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. at 833. 
 232. Id.; see supra notes 3–4, 138 and accompanying text (discussing the legal 
definitions of intent and premeditation). 
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plan.”233 
In the Anderson case, the mens rea model would have allowed 
Anderson to introduce psychiatric evidence.234  The jury could have 
then reduced Anderson’s offense to one with a lesser penalty if they 
believed his Asperger’s affected his capacity to intend or 
premeditate murder.235  However, the prosecution could have easily 
established that even though Anderson had Asperger’s, he was fully 
capable of thinking about his criminal act before he did it—as 
evidenced by Anderson posting a babysitting job online to lure 
Katherine Olson to his home.236  Any evidence of how Asperger’s 
impaired Anderson’s behavioral controls or made it difficult for 
him to appreciate the wrongfulness of murder does not negate the 
existence of his intent or premeditation; it merely explains it. 
2. The Diminished Capacity Model 
The diminished capacity model “permits the jury to mitigate 
the punishment of a mentally disabled but sane offender in any 
case where the jury believes that the defendant is less culpable than 
his normal counterpart who commits the same criminal act.”237  
The diminished capacity model allows the jury and judge to make 
more individualized judgments.238  With this model, psychological 
testimony regarding the accused’s mental disabilities is allowed 
because it may prove that the accused was less capable than a 
“normal” defendant of entertaining the required premeditation or 
intent.239 
Despite the simplicity of this model, American courts have 
refused to adopt it for a number of reasons.  Some courts believe 
that the diminished capacity model would force the judiciary to 
rewrite gradations of offenses, which the legislature has already set 
forth.240  Another explanation is that the diminished capacity 
 
 233. Arenella, supra note 49, at 834.  “Having Asperger’s . . . does not mean a 
person is more likely to be involved in criminal activities or commit a serious 
offence.”  ATTWOOD, supra note 10, at 335.  A person with Asperger’s can intend or 
premeditate just like any other person.  See id.   
 234. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.   
 235. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
 236. See State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 2010). 
 237. See Arenella, supra note 49, at 829; Robert Park Bryant & Corbin Brooke 
Hume, Note, Diminished Capacity—Recent Decisions and an Analytical Approach, 30 
VAND. L. REV. 213, 213 (1977). 
 238. See Arenella, supra note 49, at 845. 
 239. See id. at 835. 
 240. Id. at 849 (citing Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1960), 
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model creates a middle ground of partial responsibility that is 
inconsistent with the view that a defendant is either fully 
responsible for his act, and thus subject to punishment, or not 
responsible, and thus entitled to freedom.241 
If the diminished capacity model had been used in Anderson, 
the jury would have been allowed to find Anderson less culpable 
than a normal offender.242  The problem with this is it runs the risk 
of mitigating too much of the offender’s criminal responsibility, 
which other individuals will argue applies to them in future cases.  
Assuming Anderson did have Asperger’s, he was certainly high-
functioning and seemed like a typical citizen.243  This raises two 
questions for Minnesota courts: (1) whether they are prepared to 
let every person who commits a criminal act introduce evidence 
that they may have Asperger’s; and (2) whether they are prepared 
to excuse a large number of offenders who have Asperger’s.  
Minnesota courts would likely respond negatively to both 
questions.  So, the question remains: what can the law do to 
accommodate offenders with Asperger’s?  
3. Suggestion for Minnesota Courts 
The time has come where criminal law must change to 
accommodate those who are not legally insane, but have mental 
abnormalities that affect mens rea.  But before any 
recommendations can be made, the policy behind Minnesota’s 
criminal law must be emphasized.  Criminal law serves to provide 
adequate societal controls so that individuals can live in peace and 
security.244  Furthermore, criminal law strives to match legal liability 
with moral responsibility in a consistent and fair manner.245  By 
drawing from both the mens rea and diminished capacity models, 
it is possible to keep citizens safe, yet truly match legal liability and 
moral responsibility in a consistent and fair manner. 
In order to provide a fair punishment, courts must categorize 
the offender’s level of mental culpability.  When an individual is 
 
rev’d on other grounds, 336 U.S. 1 (1961)). 
 241. Id. at 849–50.  
 242. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 243. Anderson had a job at the Minneapolis airport, and his primary physician 
never noticed any indication of Asperger’s before this trial.  State v. Anderson, 789 
N.W.2d 227, 231, 239 (Minn. 2010). 
 244. State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Minn. 1992). 
 245. Id.  
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arrested, police officers could employ several procedures to aid the 
courts in rendering just and speedy verdicts.  Although police 
officers probably cannot identify Asperger’s, they could be trained 
to ask the offenders questions to determine whether mental 
abnormalities may exist.246  If the officers believe there is a mental 
abnormality, the offender can be referred to a forensic clinician.  
This clinician can then diagnose the patient and assess the degree 
of the offender’s culpability to the alleged offense.247  If the 
offender demonstrates understanding of the basic facts and the 
consequences of his or her conduct, then that individual should be 
prosecuted for the crime.  If the individual was ignorant as to the 
consequences of his or her actions, then that individual should 
receive a lesser punishment.  Punishing an individual based on 
honest ignorance is not an acceptable goal for criminal law.248 
At trial, Minnesota courts should always allow an offender to 
introduce psychiatric testimony to disprove mens rea.  This would 
ensure that all relevant evidence is provided to the jury before a 
decision is rendered.  If the accused argues that he or she has 
Asperger’s, or any other mental abnormality, mental health 
professionals should establish whether the accused does indeed 
have the disorder.249  Considering that the purpose of criminal law 
is to match the punishment with the offender’s culpability, courts 
must allow the jury to categorize the offender according to the level 
of culpability the offender possesses and mitigate punishment 
accordingly. 
Admittedly, this approach may result in unpredictable 
sentencing, which conflicts with the law’s purpose of providing 
consistent punishment.  To avoid this, the legislature could create 
several categories of criminal liability.  Juries would then be free to 
determine the level of blameworthiness the individual offender 
possesses and punish the offender accordingly. 
Another significant policy of criminal law is to protect society.  
Accordingly, if the court is faced with an individual who has a 
mental abnormality, yet is high-functioning—as Anderson was—
 
 246. See ATTWOOD, supra note 10, at 338–39. 
 247. “The assessment will include an expert opinion on the fitness to plead, 
especially the ability to comprehend relevant legal concepts and court 
procedures.”  Id.  
 248. See Wauhop, supra note 153, at 989 (citing VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 251 (2005)). 
 249. See ATTWOOD, supra note 10, at 37 (describing Gillberg diagnostic criteria 
for Asperger’s). 
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then it is completely appropriate to put him or her in jail for life.  
However, if a person with Asperger’s requires more care and 
borders on insanity, then it may be proper to mitigate the 
punishment or hospitalize the defendant. 
Ultimately, there are several issues to consider in altering 
Minnesota’s treatment of this issue.  However, presuming that all 
defendants are either sane or insane is not realistic.  Historically, 
science could not measure the degree of sanity an offender 
possessed, so defendants were either sane or insane.250  But the 
advancement of scientific evidence proves this black and white 
approach is no longer sound.  As psychiatric care progresses, the 
law will need to progress with it.  Thus, Minnesota courts should 
address the proposition of providing alternative forms of 
punishment in the near future. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Those of us with “normal” brain function know that Katherine 
Olson’s murder was a senseless, monstrous act.  But what was 
Michael Anderson thinking when he killed her?  Did Anderson 
possess adequate knowledge of wrongdoing, or did Asperger’s 
prevent him from forming mens rea?  As a society, we are quick to 
seek protection from the evils we do not understand.  But even the 
scum of the earth have civil liberties that must not be overlooked.  
In Anderson, although the court had discretion to exclude 
psychiatric testimony, it disregarded Anderson’s constitutional 
rights in doing so. 
Minnesota courts have routinely overlooked situations where 
an offender does not plead insanity, yet lacks the necessary mens 
rea to intend or premeditate a criminal offense.251  If no crime 
exists unless there is a guilty mind, defendants must be allowed the 
opportunity to defend against the mental culpability element of a 
crime.  Quite simply, it is illogical to require proof of a defendant’s 
subjective state of mind, yet deny psychiatric testimony because it is 
irrelevant to the defendant’s mindset. 
Many people are affected with mental abnormalities, and 
criminal law may need to change its procedures to accommodate 
 
 250. Arenella, supra note 49, at 862 (quoting George E. Dix, Psychological 
Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability: Diminished Capacity, Diminished 
Responsibility, and the Like, 62 CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 313, 333 (1971)). 
 251. See cases cited supra note 9. 
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them.  Years ago, a Minnesota Supreme Court Justice stated the 
following: 
There are imperfections in our system, none of them 
more troublesome than those in the area where psychiatry 
meets the law.  We must, however, continue to learn from 
psychiatry and to reflect in the law the best of what is 
known about the human mind.  Difficult as it is, we must 
try, particularly when we are confronted with a right as 
basic as the defendant’s right to have the state prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of his alleged 
crime . . . .252 
The seriousness in denying a human his or her freedom is the 
reason the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  If the Anderson court had allowed psychiatric testimony, 
Anderson would have been given his full day in court.  The jury 
would have had all relevant information presented to them before 
making the decision to put a nineteen-year-old in jail for the rest of 
his life.  Arguably, allowing expert testimony in this case would 
have done nothing more than reconfirm the basic concepts of our 
judicial system: the presumption of innocence, the due process 
requirement that the state prove each element of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and the defendant’s right to present relevant 
evidence in his defense in order to receive a fair trial.253 
 
 
 252. State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. 1982) (Wahl, J., 
dissenting). 
 253. See State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 768 (Minn. 1990) (Wahl, J., 
dissenting). 
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